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A recent report published in Neuron, a leading journal of neuroscience, by 
researchers at Japan’s ATR Computational Neuroscience Laboratories (Miyawaki 
et al. 2008) has been the basis for the claim that “new brain analysis technology 
… can reconstruct the images inside a person’s mind and display them on a 
computer monitor.”
2
 This claim was followed by what is now a traditional 
optimistic prediction made in this case by a close colleague for the media:  “These 
results are a breakthrough in terms of understanding brain activity. In as little as 
10 years, advances in this field of research may make it possible to read a 
person’s thoughts with some degree of accuracy” (Ibid). At best, however, the 
technology may allow a scientist to make inferences about whether a person may 
be experiencing one sample of a certain pre-delineated set of stimuli; and the 
claims made in the actual research paper were much more modest.  The claims 
made in the media, even by one of the researchers themselves, go far beyond this. 
 
The researchers suggest a future version of this technology could be 
applied in the fields of art and design — particularly if it becomes 
possible to quickly and accurately access images existing inside an 
artist’s head. The technology might also lead to new treatments for 
conditions such as psychiatric disorders involving hallucinations, by 
providing doctors a direct window into the mind of the patient.  … In 
the future, it may also become possible to read feelings and 




 The author thanks the Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL) in Berlin for support as 
Visiting Researcher in 2008 and 2009 to complete this paper.  Special thanks to Sabine Flach and 
Jon Georg Söffner at the ZfL.  An earlier version of the paper was presented at the UCLA 
conference on critical neuroscience in January 2009.   
2
 Reported on the science blog, Pink Tentacle -- http://www.pinktentacle.com/2008/12/scientists-
extract-images-directly-from-brain/ 
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Similar kinds of claims have been made by others.
3
  Just these kinds of claims – 
claims that when added together with all the other claims made about what 
neuroscience is capable of showing about human experience, add up to a super 
claim that the richness of human experience, informed by emotion, memory, 
imagination and diverse perceptual encounters, etc., is entirely reducible to brain 
events, and that in principle there is a clean translation possible from measurable 
processes in the brain to the fullness of the meaningful, personal and interpersonal 
experience of the lifeworld – are the target of what seems to me a justifiable 
critique of neuroscience from the perspective of Frankfurt School critical theory.  
Thus, Axel Honneth has recently written:  
 
Surrounding the current discussions concerning the results and 
social implications of brain research, it has often been remarked that 
the strictly physio-biological approach employed in this sphere 
betrays a reifying perspective. The argument goes that by 
presuming to explain human feelings and actions through the mere 
analysis of neuron firings in the brain, this approach abstracts from 
all our experience in the lifeworld, thereby treating humans as 
senseless automatons and thus ultimately as mere things.… [T]he 
fact that the neuro-physiological perspective apparently does not 
take humans' personal characteristics and perspectives into account 
is thus conceptualized as an instance of reification (Honneth 2008, 
p. 94) 
 
While endorsing this critique of reification and reductionism, I want to 
suggest that the relationship between critical theory and cognitive neuroscience is 
a two way street. 
 
o Critical theory can certainly take aim at the reifying and reductionistic 
tendencies of cognitive neuroscience (see, e.g., Choudhury, Nagel & Slaby 
2009 and this volume) 
o But also, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive science more generally 
may be able to tell us things about human behavior that that need to be 
accommodated by critical theory, or that can even support the aims of 
critical theory. 
 
I want to pursue the second of these proposals in this chapter, but in doing so it 
will become clear that if cognitive neuroscience is to inform critical theory, it 
already needs to be a critical neuroscience, that is, a cognitive neuroscience that is 
non-reifying and non-reductionistic. In regard to this project I want to suggest two 
                                                        
3
 Chris Frith, for example, in an interview with the present author, claims that we may someday be 
able to read mental states off of brain scans (see Frith and Gallagher 2002; also in Gallagher 
2008d).  Also Elger et al. (2004), declare that, “‘within the foreseeable future,’ it will be possible 
to explain and predict psychological processes such as sensations, emotions, thoughts, and 
decisions on the basis of physiochemical processes in the brain” (Habermas 2007, 14). 
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things.  First, that a cognitive neuroscience informed by phenomenological 
insights about embodied, enactive and situated cognition can be non-
reductionistic in a way that is not subject to the particular critique mentioned by 
Honneth. In other words, a phenomenologically informed neuroscience can be a 
critical neuroscience. And second, that cognitive neuroscientific studies of agency 
and social cognition, in particular, can reveal aspects of human relations 
important for improving the kind of actions and communicative practices that are 
championed by critical theory.  I think there are clear but implicit connections 
between questions of social cognition and questions of agency, intention 
formation and free will, but I will not argue for these connections here.  Instead 
I’ll focus on the fact that for both agency and social cognition the relevant 
phenomena are not reducible to just brain processes, but involve larger pragmatic 
and social interactions in the lifeworld.  
 
 
Agency and free will 
There are a number of things to say about the kind of claims made in regard to 
fMRI reconstructions of mental images found in studies by Miyawaki and others.  
From a philosophical perspective it’s not clear what neuroscientists mean by 
“images inside a person’s mind” (and here Miyawaki is not alone in using this 
terminology, see, e.g., Damasio 1999).  Many philosophers would consider this a 
return to an 18
th
-century epistemological vocabulary.  But even current 
terminology is not settled or uncontentious.  Neuroscientists, perhaps oblivious to 
ongoing philosophical debates about representationalism (see, e.g., Dreyfus 2002; 
Gallagher 2008e; Hutto 2008; Ramsey 2007; Rowlands 2006), often use terms 
like ‘representation’ without clearly defining what they mean.  These are not just 
terminological squabbles; they register serious conceptual issues about just what 
one is imaging.  There are also methodological considerations that should limit 
claims about what brain imaging actually shows.  As Overgaard (2004) points out, 
brain imaging does not give us a direct snapshot of anything like an image in the 
mind.  The brain imager does not see the brain state itself; she can only work with 
statistically massaged data based e.g., on BOLD (blood flow) signals; data that is 
manipulated in contrastive analyses which are never perfect.  Neither are 
scientists able to access the subject’s mental experience in any direct way; at best 
they are working with the subject’s report or with interpretations of overt 
behavior.  From this indirect view of the brain and mediated report on experience, 
conclusions about “images inside a person’s mind” seem several steps removed 
(fig 1).  
Debates within neuroscience on methodological questions about statistical 
analysis (e.g., Vol et al. 2009), about the use of overly general concepts to inform 
interpretations of brain-imaging studies (e.g., Legrand and Ruby 2009), as well as 
important issues regarding ecological validity in brain-imaging experiments 
certainly must be regarded as qualifications on any quick conclusions about what 
is being captured in the scanner.  On any reading, however, it is clearly not the 







 A good example of how experimental data can lead to serious confusions 
with moral and legal implications in the broader contexts of situated action can be 
seen in the use made of the Libet experiments to argue against the notion of free 
will. Psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that consciousness does not 
control behavior, that our sense of agency for action is retrospective and purely 
epiphenomenal, and, thus, that there is no such thing as free will.
4
  Part of the 
argument is based on the Libet experiments and on the idea that although we have 
a sense or feeling of freely deciding, in fact what we are going to do is already 
determined by brain processes.  The focus of the Libet experiments, however, are 
on approximately 500 ms of neuronal processing, and the question is whether we 
can say that what counts as free will is contained in this very short time span. 
Here’s a quick summary of the relevant experiment. 
 
Subjects wearing an array of surface electrodes to monitor brain activity are 
asked to flick their wrists whenever they want to (Libet et al. 1983). 50 ms 
before the movement there is activity in the motor nerves descending from 
motor cortex to your wrist.  This is preceded by 500-800 ms of brain activity 
known as the readiness potential (RP). Subjects were asked to watch a clock 
and to say when, within this time frame, they decided (or felt the urge) to move 
their wrist. One might suppose the conscious decision would be made some 
time prior to the beginning of the brain activity responsible for the movement. 
Libet shows, however, that on average, 350 ms before one is conscious of 
                                                        
4
 See, e.g., Prinz (2001); and Daniel Wegner (2002, 98): ‘The unique human convenience of 
conscious thoughts that preview our actions gives us the privilege of feeling we willfully cause 
what we do. In fact, unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious thought about 
action and the action, and also produce a sense of will we experience by perceiving the thought as 
the cause of the action. So, while our thoughts may have deep, important, and unconscious causal 
connections in our actions, the experience of conscious will arises from a process that interprets 
these connections, not from the connections themselves’.  
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deciding to move, one’s brain is activated for the motor processes that will 
result in the movement. 
 
Libet concludes that voluntary acts are "initiated by unconscious cerebral 
processes before conscious intention appears…. The initiation of the freely 
voluntary act appears to begin in the brain unconsciously, well before the person 
consciously knows he wants to act.  Is there, then, any role for conscious will in 
the performance of a voluntary act?” (Libet 2000, p. 51).  Although Wegner and 
others have considered Libet’s results as evidence that free will is an illusion, 
Libet himself contends that we can still save free will – because there is still 
approximately 150 ms of brain activity left after we are conscious of our decision, 
and before we move we have time to consciously veto the movement.   
 I have argued elsewhere that Libet’s experiment is about motor control 
mechanisms rather than free will, precisely because it focuses on control of bodily 
movement rather than engaged action in the world (Gallagher 2005; 2006).  This, 
however, may be puzzling for philosophers since the standard understanding of 
agency and mental causation has been framed precisely in terms of control of 
bodily movement, at least since the time of Descartes.  One need only compare 
Descartes’ view to that of recent philosophers’ statements about mental causation 
to see what the long-standing standard view is. 
 
Now the action of the soul consists entirely in this, that simply by willing it 
makes the small [pineal] gland to which it is closely united move in the way 
requisite for producing the effect aimed at in the volition …. when we will 
to walk or to move the body in any manner, this volition causes the gland to 
impel the spirits toward the muscles which bring about this effect. … Our 
volitions, in turn, are also of two kinds.  Some actions of the soul terminate 
in the soul itself, … other actions terminate in our body, as when from our 
merely willing to walk, it follows that our legs are moved and that we walk. 
(Descartes 1649, §§ xli, xliii,xv iii) 
 
In the case of normal voluntary action, movements of the agent's body have 
amongst their causes intentional states of that agent which are 'about' just 
such movements.  For instance, when I try to raise my arm and succeed in 
doing so, my arm goes up – and amongst the causes of its going up are such 
items as a desire of mine that my arm should go up.  The intentional causes 
of physical events are always 'directed' upon the occurrence of just such 





Neuroscientists follow this standard view.  Haggard and Libet (2001), for 
example, frame the problem in the same way, referring to it as the traditional 
concept of free will: "how can a mental state (my conscious intention) initiate the 
                                                        
5
 Raising one’s hand is a favorite example in the philosophical literature. I note that Lowe is in 
good company; similar statements can be found in many contemporary philosophers – e.g., 
Frankfurt(1978), Searle (1984), Proust (2003). 
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neural events in the motor areas of the brain that lead to my body movement?" (p. 
47). 
Against this standard view, I suggest we think of the consciousness that 
pertains to action not as a consciousness of deciding to move one’s body – indeed, 
as neuropsychology and phenomenology suggest, one’s consciousness of normal 
bodily movement is minimal and recessive. For most intentional action when I 
decide to act, I do not first decide, for example, to locate my hand and then decide 
to move it in a specific way. We do not ordinarily think about flicking our wrists 
in the larger contexts of action.  The processes that Libet studies are automatic 
body-schematic processes – processes that we are not normally aware of in the 
details of our movements.  As Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004) explain, "both the 
experience of willing and the experience of acting are what-experiences and we 
are mostly unaware of the how-experiences of an action … [That is] we do not 
experience willing specific muscle contractions, joint torques, or movement 
velocities … our conscious access to our motor processes is thus extremely 
limited”  (p. 121).  Libet’s experiments measure processes that pertain to the how 
of movement, and to a reflective consciousness of bodily movement that normally 
does not exist in situated action.  
To be sure, complexities tied to embodied and situated action have not 
been carried over into neuroscientific experiments.  But some experiments do start 
to point to a broader action arena, and they do so in a way that begins to show that 
the sense of agency is more complex than Libet or Wegner suggest.  I’ll discuss 
just one of several experiments (Farrer and Frith 2003; also see e.g., Chaminade 
and Decety 2002; Farrer et al. 2003) that begin with the phenomenological 
distinction between sense of agency (the experience of being the author of one’s 
action) and sense of ownership (the experience that one’s body is moving),
6
 and 
then attempt to identify the neural correlates of the sense of agency.  
The experimental design in Farrer and Frith (2003) is as follows. 
 
Subjects manipulated a joystick [to drive a colored circle moving on 
a screen to specific locations on the screen]. Sometimes the subject 
caused this movement [on the screen] and sometimes the 
experimenter. This paradigm allowed us to study the sense of 
agency without any confounding from the sense of ownership. To 
achieve this subjects were requested to execute an action during all 
the different experimental conditions. By doing so the effect related 
to the sense of ownership (I am performing an action [I am 
moving]) would be present in all conditions and would be canceled 




 See Gallagher (2000) for this distinction. The sense of agency and the sense of ownership are 
difficult to distinguish in normal action, but they can easily be distinguished in involuntary 
movement or reflex.  In the case of involuntary movement, for example, if someone is 
manipulating my body I have the experience of my body moving (a sense of ownership), but not 
the sense that I am the author of the movement (sense of agency).   
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Why does the sense of ownership remain constant while the sense of agency 
changes? The experimenters understand the sense of agency to be something 
more than an experience generated by motor control processes; rather, it is tied to 
the intentional aspects of the action, that is, to the perceptual monitoring of what 
I’m accomplishing in the world rather than to motor control.  It’s not about 
moving the joystick or moving one’s body; it’s about doing something on the 
computer screen.  Results show that when subjects feel that someone else is 
controlling the action on the screen (no sense of agency), the right inferior parietal 
cortex is activated.  In contrast, when they feel that they are controlling the action 
on the screen, the anterior insula is activated bilaterally.   
 One thing that seems important for the proper interpretation of these 
results is the phenomenological distinction between a feeling of agency for bodily 
action, generated in efferent processes, and the correlated perceptual intentionality 
of accomplishing something in the world.  The experimenters do not keep this 
distinction as conceptually clear as they should, and when they attempt to explain 
why the anterior insula is involved in the sense of agency they focus on bodily 
movement and motor control. “[The sense of agency] occurs in the context of a 
body moving in time and space. … There is evidence that both the inferior 
parietal lobe and the anterior insula are … involved in the representation of body 
schema…” (p. 601) At the same time they point out that the anterior insula 
involves the integration of three kinds of self-specifying signals generated in self-
movement:  
 
• somatosensory signals (sensory feedback from bodily movement, e.g., 
proprioception)  
• visual and auditory signals containing ecological information about 
movement, and  
• corollary discharge associated with efferent motor commands that control 
movement. 
 
Ecological information, of course, is tied to non-conscious or possibly pre-
reflective monitoring of my relation to the environment, and this is certainly an 
important element in the sense of agency.  It is likely, however, that in some cases 
even a more explicitly conscious perceptual monitoring is ongoing in action.  
Searle (1983) calls this “intention-in-action,” and it is certainly one of the 
contributories to a full sense of agency, along with more deliberated intentions 
formed prior to the action (Gallagher, in press; Pacherie 2006; 2007).   
The argument here is based on a complex phenomenological account of 
the sense of agency which depends not just on the efferent signals of motor 
control mechanisms, but on pre-reflective perceptual monitoring of what I am 
accomplishing in the world, as well as on reflective, prospective and 
retrospective, deliberations about means and ends. Beyond this relatively narrow 
phenomenology, however, beyond the brain-based and cognitive processes just 
mentioned, at the most relevant pragmatic level, embodied action is enacted in a 
world that is physical and social and that often reflects perceptual and affective 
saliences, as well as the effects of physical and social forces and affordances -- 
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normative elements of the subject’s social and cultural milieu.  The sense of 
agency will accordingly be modulated by this larger context. Conceptions of 
agency, intention, and free will are best conceived in terms that integrate all of 
these aspects. What I freely decide to do is not about bodily movements -- it's 
about my pragmatic or socially defined actions. Intentions often get co-constituted 
in interactions with others – indeed, some kind of intentions may not be reducible 
to processes that are contained exclusively within one individual. In this case, free 
will is a matter of degree – it can be won or lost  -- it can be enhanced or reduced 
– by physical, social, economic, cultural factors – including our own 
communicative and narrative practices.  
 The point I want to make here is that this kind of interchange between 
phenomenology and neuroscience points in the direction of a more complex 
picture involving not just brain processes “in the head,” but certain physical and 
social aspects of the environment.  Any adequate discussion of agency and free 
will needs to consider the longer time scale (certainly more than 500 ms) and 
wider contexts.  In effect, even if we cannot “PET” or “fMRI” the lifeworld, as 
phenomenologists define it and critical theorists analyze it, the lifeworld, and 
what Habermas (2007) calls “the participant’s involvement in shared lifeworld 
practices,” need to be taken into consideration in the interpretation of 
experimental results.    This, accordingly, would be a non-reductionist use of 
neuroscience.   
 Habermas sets the discourse of neuroscience and the discourse of 
responsible agency in opposition, and he contends that “the constellations of 
conditions that render actions intelligible and explainable differ in kind, 
conceptually, from the constellations of events linked by laws of nature” (2007, p. 
17).  In fact, however, we should not see these as completely distinct realms, even 
if we need different vocabularies to explain them.  A breakdown at the level of 
neuronal processing is never just a brain event, since the brain is embodied and 
the body is embedded in an environment that is physical, social, cultural, and so 
forth.  To say that I act the way I do because 300 ms before each bodily 
movement the brain engages in preparatory processes amounts to a completely 
inadequate explanation of intentional action; but neither can we claim to have the 
whole picture by pointing exclusively to conscious intention formation or the 
enabling and constraining factors involved in social structures.  Non-neural 
factors have an effect on neural factors, and vice versa, since the system is brain-
body-environment and is organized dynamically across time. Disruptions in any 
part of the system – in the brain or even in those aspects that involve conscious 
deliberation and amounts of time in excess of 300 ms – can lead to disruptions in 
action.  If, as Habermas and many others suggest, the languages of neuroscience 
and freedom-responsibility are irreducible to each other, that should not be a 
problem since we have both languages and we can say more with both than we 
can with only one.  
 
Theory of mind 
To pursue the idea that a non-reductive neuroscience can contribute to critical 
theory, I want to show how a phenomenologically informed account of the 
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neuroscience of social cognition can reframe certain aspects of a critical theory of 
communicative action.  This project is larger than I can outline here, but I will 
focus on one important controversy in social neuroscience and try to show the 
implications of a particular interpretation for critical theory.  
Let me first set the stage of the large and current debate on social cognition. 
Theory of mind (ToM) is one way to name the standard theories that dominate 
this debate in philosophy of mind, psychology, and social neuroscience.  Under 
this heading there are two main contenders.  The first is theory theory (TT) – so 
called because it proposes that our understanding of others is based on a theory, 
namely, folk psychology, the general commonsense understanding that we have 
about human behavior.  The idea defended by TT is that in understanding others, 
we use folk psychology to make inferences about their mental states (typically 
identified as propositional attitudes like belief and desire).  Alternatively, 
simulation theory (ST) contends that we have something better than theory; we 
have direct access to our own mind and we are capable of using it as a model to 
simulate the mental states of others.  We do this, explicitly (consciously) or 
implicitly, by introducing pretend mental states (pretend beliefs, pretend desires) 
into the mechanisms of our own minds, and then projecting the results to the 
minds of others.  Alvin Goldman offers a concise 3-step formula for this 
procedure. 
 
1. First, the attributor creates in herself pretend states intended to 
match those of the target. In other words, the attributor attempts to 
put herself in the target’s ‘‘mental shoes.’’ 
2. The second step is to feed these initial pretend states [e.g., beliefs], 
into some mechanism of the attributor’s own psychology ... and 
allow that mechanism to operate on the pretend states so as to 
generate one or more new states [e.g., decisions]. 
3. Third, the attributor assigns the output state to the target ... [e.g., 
we infer or project the decision to the other’s mind] (Goldman, 
2005, pp. 80-81). 
 
Let me add two complications to this basic account.  First, because it is left 
unexplained how we might accomplish the first step without already having the 
knowledge that ST is meant to explain, many theorists (including Goldman 
himself, 2006) now adopt a hybrid approach that combines TT and ST.  
Specifically, one appeals to folk psychology in order to understand what the other 
target’s “mental shoes” look like.  Second, theorists of ST have recently 
developed an implicit version of this approach that makes use of the neuroscience 
of mirror neurons.  I’ll return to this topic shortly. 
Notably, both TT and ST share three basic assumptions. 
 
o Mentalistic supposition: we understand others to be other minds that are 
inaccessible.  Mindreading involves an attempt to explain or predict their 
behavior on the basis of their mental states -- the beliefs or desires they 
have, or as John Flavell recently put it, “the inner world inhabited by 
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beliefs, desires, emotions, thoughts, perceptions, intentions and other 
mental states” (2004, 274). 
o Spectatorial supposition: For the most part we are observers who take a 
3
rd
-person stance toward others.  Descriptions in TT or ST picture the 
subject as standing back observing the actions of others and trying to 
interpret them from that stance.
7
  
o Universal supposition: Mindreading is our primary and pervasive way of 
understanding others (starting sometime around the age of 3 or 4 years, 




Two things are clear from this set of suppositions.  First, whatever our ordinary, 
usual way of understanding others actually is, it must enter into and constrain our 
communicative practices. Second, if our ordinary, usual way of understanding 
others is best described by either TT or ST, or by some hybrid version, then there 
are already some issues of concern to critical theorists.  Honneth, following a long 
tradition in critical theory, objects to reifying practices that involve “detached 
observation” of one subject by another.  Yet, if ToM genuinely captures our 
                                                        
7
 Carruthers recently denied that TT requires the spectatorial supposition.  Responding to my 
criticisms of TT, he writes: “In particular, it is simply false that theory-theorists must (or do) 
assume that mentalizing usually involves the adoption of a third-person, detached and 
observational, perspective on other people. On the contrary, theory theorists have always 
emphasized that the primary use of mindreading is in interaction with others (which Gallagher 
calls “second-personal”)” (2009, p. 166-167).  Really?  In almost every major account of TT the 
description is cast in terms of the mindreader observing the other and making inferences from that 
stance.  One finds this consistently to be the case, for example, not only in the discussion of, but in 
the design of the false-belief tests that are pervasively cited in the ToM literature.  In standard 
false-belief tasks, the subject is always called upon to “explain” or predict the action of another 
person with whom they are not interacting; and in contrast with the observational stance that is 
studied in these experiments, there is no comment on the subject’s usually smooth second-person 
interactions with the experimenter. 
8
 I have a large collection of statements endorsing this universal (or at least close to universal) 
supposition.  Here are just a few. 
 
[…] Mind-reading and the capacity to negotiate the social world are not the same 
thing, but the former seems to be necessary for the latter. … our basic grip on the 
social world depends on our being able to see our fellows as motivated by beliefs and 
desires we sometimes share and sometimes do not. (Currie and Sterelny (2000: 145).  
 
The strongest form of ST would say that all cases of (third-person) mentalization 
employ simulation.  A moderate version would say, for example, that simulation is 
the default method of mentalization … I am attracted to the moderate version …. 
Simulation is the primitive, root form of interpersonal mentalization. (Goldman 
2002: 7-8)  
 
Human beings are inveterate mindreaders. We routinely (and for the most part 
unconsciously) represent the mental states to (sic) the people around us …. We 
attribute to them perceptions, feelings, goals, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, and 
we form our expectations accordingly. While it isn’t the case that all forms of social 
interaction require mindreading … it is quite certain that without it, human social life 
would be very different indeed. (Carruthers 2009, 121). 
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natural capacities for social cognition, taking a detached, third-person, 
observational stance may be unavoidable.   
 
Here the subject is no longer empathetically engaged in interaction 
with its surroundings but is instead placed in the perspective of a 
neutral observer, psychically and existentially untouched by its 
surroundings. The concept of “contemplation” [observation] thus 
indicates not so much an attitude of theoretical immersion or 
concentration as it does a stance of indulgent, passive observation… 
(Honneth 2008, 98-99) 
 
Likewise, ST throws up some important problems from the perspective of 
critical theory.  One criticism, targeting an earlier version of ST (the argument 
from inference by analogy) was voiced by both Max Scheler (1923/1954) and 
Gilbert Ryle (1949).  According to the latter, for example, "the observed 
appearances and actions of people differ very markedly, so the imputation to them 
of inner processes closely matching [one's own or] one another would be actually 
contrary to the evidence" (Ryle 1949, p. 54).  In other words, people are diverse 
and it is somewhat presumptuous to reduce this diversity to something that can be 
easily modeled by one’s own first-person experience, as ST would suggest. In a 
broader view this is an important point for critical theory, and I’ll return to this 
later. 
Before we leave these standard accounts, we need to say something about the 
recent development of neural ST. Neural ST conceives of simulation as a 
subpersonal process.  This is an approach that has gained more ground in recent 
years by appealing to neuroscientific evidence involving subpersonal activation of 
the mirror (neuron) system.
9
 Mirror neurons (MNs) in the pre-motor cortex, 
including Broca’s area, are said to be activated both when the subject engages in 
specific instrumental actions and when the subject sees someone else engage in 
those actions (Rizzolatti et al., 1996, 2000). In broad terms, one’s motor system 
resonates when one encounters another person. The claim made by ST is that 
these subpersonal mechanisms constitute a simulation of the other’s intentions. 
Thus Gallese contends that ‘‘when we observe actions performed by other 
individuals our motor system ‘resonates’ along with that of the observed agent . . . 
action understanding heavily relies on a neural mechanism that matches 
[simulates], in the same neuronal substrate, the observed behaviour with the one 
[the observer could execute] . . . ’’ (2001, pp. 38-39; see Gallese & Goldman 
1998). The hypothesis is just this: understanding others is achieved by simulating 
the other’s action “with the help of a motor equivalence between what the others 
do and what the observer does” (2001, 39). This is a subpersonal process 
                                                        
9
 E.g., Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti (1995); Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese (2000); 
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi (1996).  I leave aside the recent criticisms that raise 
questions about the existence of MNs in humans (see, e.g., Dinstein et al. 2008; Hickok 2009).  
This is clearly an empirical question with implications for ST.  But even if we assume that there 
are MNs in the human brain, the more philosophical question is whether they can be considered 
what Oberman and Ramachandran (2008) call ‘simulator neurons’. 
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generated by “automatic, implicit, and nonreflexive simulation mechanisms . . .” 
(Gallese 2005, p. 117).  
Neural ST understood in these or in similar terms has been the growing 
consensus. Indeed, use of the term ‘simulation’ has become the standard way of 
referring to mirror system activation. Thus, for example, Marc Jeannerod and 
Elizabeth Pacherie write: 
 
As far as the understanding of action is concerned, we regard 
simulation as the default procedure…. We also believe that 
simulation is the root form of interpersonal mentalization and that it 
is best conceived as a hybrid of explicit and implicit processes, with 
subpersonal neural simulation serving as a basis for explicit mental 
simulation (Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004, p. 129). 
 
Goldman (2006) now distinguishes between simulation as high-level mind-
reading and simulation as low-level mind-reading where the latter is “simple, 
primitive, automatic, and largely below the level of consciousness” (p. 113), the 
prototype for which is “the mirroring type of simulation process” (p. 147). That 
MN activation is a simulation not only of the goal of the observed action but of 
the intention of the acting individual, and therefore a form of mindreading, is 
suggested by research that shows MNs discriminate identical movements 
according to the intentional action and the simple pragmatic contexts in which 





An alternative theory 
For present purposes I want to focus on some important criticisms of neural ST, 
but before I do that let me outline an alternative theory that emphasizes embodied 
interaction.
11
  Interaction theory (IT) offers an alternative account of social 
cognition that opposes the three basic suppositions made in ToM approaches.  In 
opposition to the mentalistic supposition which treats the other as a Cartesian 
mind that is hidden away, IT maintains that we have a direct perceptual access to 
the other’s intentions and emotions via their embodied actions, movements, 
gestures, facial expressions, etc.  In opposition to the spectatorial supposition that 
takes third-person observation to be our normal stance toward others, IT holds 
that in our everyday encounters with each other we are primarily interacting in 
second-person relations where the task is not explanation but understanding and 
pragmatic doing.  And in opposition to the universal supposition IT holds that 
there are many kinds of human relations, but interaction rather than mindreading 
                                                        
10
 Neural simulation has also been offered as an explanation of how we grasp emotions and pain in 
others (Avenanti and Aglioti 2006; Minio-Paluello, Avenanti and Aglioti 2007; Gallese, Eagle, 
Migone 2007). The idea that “simulator neurons” are responsible for understanding actions, 
thoughts, and emotions is taken up by Oberman and Ramachandran (2007; 2008) who amass 
evidence that the MN system as an internal simulation mechanism is dysfunctional in cases of 
autism. 
11
 I’ve outlined the phenomenological critique of TT and ST in other places (Gallagher 2001; 
2004; 2005; 2007a; 2008a,b). 
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characterizes most of our encounters, while the use of theory or simulation for this 
purpose is a relatively rare occurrence. 
 IT points to three broad kinds of capacities for understanding others.  The 
first consists of a set of sensory-motor capacities included under the concept of 
primary intersubjectivity, a term originating with Colwyn Trevarthen (1979) 
working in developmental psychology. These basic sensory-motor capacities, 
some of which are found in infants from birth, are geared to interaction with 
others.  They include the capacity for neonate and very early imitation (Meltzoff 
and Moore 1977; 1994; Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996). Young infants are also 
able to parse the surrounding environment into those entities that perform human 
actions and those that do not (Meltzoff and Brooks 2001; Johnson 2000; Johnson 
et al. 1998; Legerstee 1991).  For the infant, the other person's body presents 
opportunities for action and expressive behavior – opportunities that it can pursue 
through imitation.  There is, in this case, a common bodily intentionality that is 
shared by infant and caregiver.  In addition, the ability to detect correspondences 
between visual and auditory information that specify the expression of emotions 
starts as early as 5 to 7 months (Walker, 1982; also, Hobson, 1993; 2002), and at 
9 months, the ability to follow the other person’s eye gaze (Senju, Johnson and 
Csibra 2007). Such perceptual abilities serve affective coordination between the 
gestures and expressions of the infant and those of caregivers with whom they 
interact.  Infants "vocalize and gesture in a way that seems 'tuned' [affectively and 
temporally] to the vocalizations and gestures of the other person" (Gopnik and 
Meltzoff 1997, 131). Infants, then, are not simply observing others; they are 
interacting with them from the very beginning. 
In primary intersubjectivity, then, our preliminary access to others is based 
on these innate or early developing capacities manifested at the level of perceptual 
experience -- we see, in the other person’s bodily movements, facial expressions, 
gestures, eye direction, etc. what they intend and what they feel, and we react to 
them.  Infants as young as 6 months perceive grasping as goal directed; infants at 
10-11 months are able to parse some kinds of continuous action according to 
intentional boundaries (Baldwin and Baird 2001; Baird and Baldwin 2001; 
Woodward, & Sommerville 2000). By the end of the first year of life, infants have 
a non-mentalistic, perceptually-based embodied understanding of the intentions 
and dispositions of other persons (Allison, Puce, and McCarthy 2000; Baldwin, 
1993; Johnson 2000; Johnson et al. 1998). 
 These primary capacities do not disappear with maturity; they become 
more nuanced.  Thus Scheler, Wittgenstein, and others have described the 
everyday phenomenology of perceiving others as a direct perception of their 
feelings and intentions.  
 
For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with 
another person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his 
tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his 
outstretched hands …. And with the tenor of this thoughts in the sound 
of his words. (Scheler 1954, 260–61). 
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Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it, and a 
particular shade of consciousness.  You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, 
interest, excitement, torpor, and so on.… Do you look into yourself in 
order to recognize the fury in his face? (Wittgenstein 1967 §229) 
 
In general I do not surmise fear in him – I see it. I do not feel that I am 
deducing the probable existence of something inside from something 
outside; rather it is as if the human face were in a way translucent and 
that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own. 
(Wittgenstein 1980, § 170) 
 
As we’ll see, the best way to characterize this ability to see meaning in the other 
person’s actions and expressions is to say that social perception is enactive – that 
is, that it is geared to interaction with others..  
A second set of capacities belongs to what Trevarthen calls secondary 
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978). Expressions, intonations, 
gestures, and movements, along with the bodies that manifest them, do not float 
freely in thin air; we find them situated in the world, and infants soon start to 
notice how others interact with things in the environment. In such interactions the 
child looks to the body and the expressive movement of the other to discern the 
intention of the person or to find the meaning of some object. Around the age of 1 
year, the infant thus goes beyond person-to-person immediacy and enters contexts 
of joint attention (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, and Rutter 1992)
12
 -- shared situations – 
the pragmatic and social situations in the everyday lifeworld where we learn what 
things mean and what they are for.  The child can understand that the other person 
wants food or intends to open the door; that the other can see him (the child) or is 
looking at the door. They begin to see that another’s movements and expressions 
often depend on meaningful and pragmatic contexts and are mediated by the 
surrounding world.   
There are two aspects involved in secondary intersubjectivity that are 
important to distinguish (see Gallagher 2009).  The first is the social cognitive 
aspect.  As we interact with others we learn their intentions and we gain 
understanding of them through their behavior towards us and towards the things 
in the surrounding world, and through the richly pragmatic and social contexts of 
such interactions.  The second aspect is what DeJaegher and DiPaolo (2007) call 
‘participatory sense making’.  As we interact with others we not only gain an 
understanding of them, we gain an understanding of the world that we share with 
them. Our attention to objects in the world around us changes when others are 
present – even if our attention is not explicitly guided by others (Becchio et al 
2008). Empirical studies show that when we see another person’s face simply 
looking towards or away from an object we evaluate the object looked at as more 
valuable than the object not looked at. An emotional expression on the face results 
in a stronger effect (Bayliss et al. 2006; 2007).  Brain imaging studies show that 
what we see other people do primes our system for action with objects. Motor-
                                                        
12
 Reddy (2008) summarizes recent evidence that suggests joint attention is likely present around 9 
months, and is pre-figured in behavior even earlier.  
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related areas of the brain -- dorsal premotor cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
inferior parietal cortex, the superior temporal sulcus – are activated not only when 
we see someone reach for an object, but simply if we see them gaze at an object 
(Friesen et al. 2005; Pierno et al. 2006; 2008).  Thus, objects surrounding us take 
on meaning within the context of our shared projects.  We begin to make sense 
out of the world through our participation with others in pragmatic contexts, and 
the shared lifeworld starts to open up precisely in such participation. 
The actions of others are always framed in pragmatic and socially defined 
contexts. It follows that there is not one uniform way in which we relate to others, 
but that our relations are mediated through the various pragmatic (and ultimately, 
institutional) circumstances of our encounters.  In understanding others, then, the 
world itself does some of the work – sometimes the actual physical situation, or 
location; sometimes the institutional setting and the various social roles played by 
individuals.  We come to understand how things work and how contexts can 
inform the emotions, intentions, and thoughts of others.  In this very real sense, a 
complete explanation of social cognition is not possible simply in terms of 
neuronal processes; since it clearly involves others in extra-neural contexts and 
worldly events, it is not reducible to the worldless realm of brain events. The 
lifeworld cannot be reduced to appropriate scanner size.  
A third set of capacities are required to account for the more nuanced and 
sophisticated understandings we attain as adults.  These are communicative and 
narrative competencies that allow us to fill in and properly frame the interactive 
contexts that help to make sense out of people’s actions (Gallagher and Hutto 
2007; Hutto 2008). If IT helps us to see how a phenomenologically informed 
cognitive science avoids the reductionist aspects of cognitive neuroscience, as 
well as the reifying approaches to social cognition found in ToM, capacities 
involved in communicative and narrative competency suggest how IT can offer 
something more positive to the kind of critical theory that develops around the 
concept of communicative practice.  There is much more to say, especially in 
regard to narrative competency but for purposes of this chapter I will focus my 




Neural simulation or enactive perception? 
At the neuronal level the mirror neuron (MN) system may (or may not
13
) 
underlie some of the capacities of primary intersubjectivity.  For that reason it 
might seem that the idea of an implicit neural simulation would help to support 
interaction theory, or that IT is just a version of ST. There are, however, several 
things wrong with thinking of MN activation as a simulation process (see 
Gallagher 2007; 2008c).  First, the meaning of the term ‘simulation’ as defined by 
ST involves two essential aspects that are simply missing in the activation of 
                                                        
13
 As we noted before, there are still disagreements about whether there is good scientific evidence 
for MNs in humans (see, e.g., Dinstein et al. 2008); but if there are MNs in humans, there are still 
debates about whether they have anything to do with social cognition (see Hickok 2009).  
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MNs.  According to that definition simulation (1) involves pretense and (2) has an 
instrumental character. 
For example, in Goldman’s explanation: simulation involves "pretend 
states" where, by pretend state he means “some sort of surrogate state, which is 
deliberately adopted for the sake of the attributor's task … In simulating practical 
reasoning, the attributor feeds pretend desires and beliefs into her own practical 
reasoning system” (2002, 7; see Adams 2001; Bernier 2002). The aspect of 
pretense is part of what distinguishes simulation from a TT model or a simple 
practice of reasoning (see Fisher 2006).  The claim for pretense is found even in 
subpersonal accounts:  as Gallese puts it, "our motor system becomes active as if 
we were executing that very same action that we are observing" (2001: 37).  
Likewise for Gordon (2005: 96) the neurons that respond when I see your 
intentional action, respond "as if I were carrying out the behavior …"   
Despite these claims, it is difficult to see how pretense can be involved at 
the sub-personal level, in the neuronal processes themselves.  Activation of MNs 
per se cannot represent or register pretense in the way required by ST since MNs 
are “neutral” in regard to the agent (Gallese 2005; Hurley 2005; Jeannerod and 
Pacherie 2004); that is, they are activated both when I engage in intentional action 
and when I see you engage in intentional action.  Accordingly, in MN activation 
there is no first- or third-person specification, in which case, it is not possible for 
them to register my intentions as pretending to be your intentions.  There can be 
no “as if” of the sort required by ST because there is no ‘I’ or ‘you’ represented.    
With respect to characterizing simulation as instrumental, it is often 
described as a mechanism or model that we manipulate or control in order to 
understand something to which we do not have access (see Goldman’s description 
above). Gordon locates instrumental control at the neuronal level by suggesting 
that on the "cognitive-scientific" model, "one's own behavior control system is 
employed as a manipulable model of other such systems. (This is not to say that 
the "person" who is simulating is the model; rather, only that one's brain can be 
manipulated to model other persons)” (2004, 1). 
In this regard, however, if simulation is characterized as a process that I 
(or my brain) instrumentally use(s), manipulate(s), or control(s), then the implicit 
processes of motor resonance are not good examples of simulation.  Certainly, at 
the personal level, we do not manipulate or control the activated brain areas -- in 
fact, we have no instrumental access to neuronal activation. Pace Gordon, it’s not 
clear where anything like manipulation comes into play. Indeed, in precisely the 
intersubjective circumstances that we are considering, these neuronal systems do 
not take the initiative; they do not activate themselves.  Rather, they are 
automatically activated by the other person's action. The other person has an 
effect on us and elicits this activation. It is not us (or our brain) manipulating 
anything; it’s the other who does something to us via a perceptual elicitation. 
Perhaps, however, this objection targets a step-wise version of ST that is 
not favoured by neural simulationists.
14
 Indeed, anticipating objections about the 
                                                        
14
 Hutto (in press) suggests that this kind of objection targets the wrong concept of simulation; and 
Gordon suggests that “there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from 
certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher’s view that our primary and 
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involvement of pretence and instrumentality, Goldman (2006; Goldman & 
Sripada 2005) argues that the instrumental and pretense conditions are not 
necessary conditions for simulation, and that simulation involves something more 
minimal.  
 
[…] We do not regard the creation of pretend states, or the 
deployment of cognitive equipment to process such states, as 
essential to the generic idea of simulation. The general idea of 
simulation is that the simulating process should be similar, in 
relevant respects, to the simulated process. Applied to mindreading, 
a minimally necessary condition is that the state ascribed to the 
target is ascribed as a result of the attributor’s instantiating, 
undergoing, or experiencing, that very state. In the case of successful 
simulation, the experienced state matches that of the target. This 
minimal condition for simulation is satisfied [in the neural model] 
(Goldman and Sripada 2005, 208). 
 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008; Sinigaglia 2009; Flanagan and Johansson 2003) 
also favor what they term the Direct Matching Hypothesis (DMH).  There are a 
number of things we could say in response to this tactic (see Gallagher 2008c). 
Here let me just note that against this view, the minimal condition of matching 
cannot be the pervasive or default way of attaining an understanding of others. If 
simulation were the default mode of social cognition, and as automatic as mirror 
neurons firing, then it would seem that we would automatically go into the mental 
or motor state of the other person whenever we properly see their action, and we 
would not be able to attribute to ourselves a state different from the other person’s 
mental or action state. But we do this all the time. Seeing you angry doesn’t 
automatically make me angry – indeed, it may make me afraid.  There are many 
cases of encountering others in which we simply do not adopt, or find ourselves in 
a matching state. When I see you trip and start to fall, I do not simulate your 
movement; I do not find myself starting to fall; rather I find myself trying to reach 
out to catch you – so my motor system is clearly in a different state from yours. 
Furthermore, consider the difficulties involved if we were interacting with more 
than one person, especially if in such interpersonal interactions the actions and 
intentions of each person are affected by the actions and intentions of the others 
(see Morton 1995).   
 In this regard a study by Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, (2007) demonstrates that 
learning can work against matching. The experimenters trained subjects to move 
their fingers in a manner incongruent with an observed hand, for example, moving 
the little finger when they observed movement of the index finger.  After training, 
MEPs were greater in the little finger when index finger movement was observed. 
“The important implication of this result is that study participants who exhibited 
incongruent MEP responses presumably did not mistake the perception of index 
finger movement for little finger movement…” (Hickok 2009, 1236).  That is, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
pervasive way of engaging with others rests on ‘direct’, non-mentalizing perception of the 
‘meanings’ of others’ facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions” (Gordon 2008, p. 219).   
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lack of matching in the motor system does not preempt some kind of recognition 
of what the other person is doing.  
The phenomenology and behavioural logic of these examples are 
supported by the details of the scientific data on MNs. MN activation in monkeys 
does not always involve a precise match between motor system execution and 
observed action. Conservatively, between 21 and 45% of neurons identified as 
mirror neurons are sensitive to multiple types of action; of those activated by a 
single type of observed action, that action is not necessarily the same action 
defined by the motor properties of the neuron.  Further, approximately 60% of 
mirror neurons are “broadly congruent,” which means there may be some relation 
between the observed action(s) and their associated executed action, but not an 
exact match.  Only about one-third of mirror neurons show a one-to-one 
congruence (Csibra (2005).
15
 It’s likely that broadly congruent MN activation is 
preparation for a responsive complementary action rather than a matching action 
(Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, 55).  In that case MN activation could not 
constitute a simulation even in the minimal sense.  
In denying that MN activation is a form of simulation, I am not denying 
the possibility that MNs may be involved in our interactions with others, possibly 
contributing to our ability to understand others or to keep track of ongoing 
intersubjective relations. There is some evidence that the mirror system is 
involved when we perceive not only the other person’s action, but when we 
perceive the other person being touched (Blakemore et al. 2005), when we 
perceive their emotional states (Jabbi, Swart, and Keysers 2007), facial 
expressions (van der Gaag, Minderra and Keysers 2007), and emotional bodily 
movements (Pichon, de Gelder and Grézes 2008a&b).  In contrast to thinking of 
MNs as part of a simulation process, over and above perceptual processes, a more 
parsimonious interpretation of MN activation, consistent with IT, is possible. The 
line between neuronal activation in the visual system and neuronal activation of 
the mirror system is not a line that we should draw between perception and 
simulation.  Rather, mirror resonance processes can be considered part of the 
neuronal processes that underlie the kind of direct, enactive perception found in 
primary intersubjectivity.  
The idea of an enactive social perception is consistent with the basic idea 
of enactive perception (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), where the act of 
perception is defined not simply as a sensory activation but includes motor 
components. Perception is primarily for action. In the case of intersubjectivity, 
perception is for interaction. The corresponding phenomenology is this: in most 
cases, when I see the other's action or gesture or emotional expression, I directly 
perceive the meaning in the action or gesture or expression.  I see the joy or I see 
the anger, I see what they must feel, or I see the intention in the face or in the 
posture or in the gesture or action of the other. I see it.  I don't have to simulate it; 
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 A recent study by van Schie et al. (2008) does find matching (of same-action-related neurons to 
observed action) in the automatic initial time frame of congruent MN activation (taking place less 
than 100 ms after activation of visual cortex).  But this study also shows that this initial matching 
does not register any of the important specifics of the action in relation to goal or intention, 
correctness or incorrectness, or any other parameters that are important for social cognition. 
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and I see is as something I can respond to – I see is as “respondable to.” This kind 
of perception depends, of course, not just on MNs, but on a complex of 
subpersonal neuronal processes that include activation of sensory areas (e.g., 
visual cortex), association areas, as well as motor areas.  These articulated 
neuronal processes that may include activation of MNs contribute as part of the 
neural correlates of a non-articulated immediate perception of the other person's 
intentional actions, rather than a distinct process of simulating their intentions. If 
mirror activation is involved, on this interpretation it is not the initiation of 
simulation; it's part of an enactive intersubjective perception of what the other is 
doing. That is, I see the other’s action as something I can respond to.  Action 
perception in the interactive context is action priming -- I perceive the action of 
the other as a social affordance.  
 
Implications for critical theory 
Questions of free will and responsibility are directly linked to questions about 
intersubjectivity, since responsibility may be conceived of as answerablity to 
others. Responsibility is something that we attribute to others; and we also accept 
attribution of responsibility from others.  That I am responsible for my action 
suggests that I should be able to give (to others, or to myself as another) reasons 
for acting the way I did where such reasons go beyond a list of mechanical causes.  
Habermas draws a strict line between reasons, which he characterizes as 
“arguments that express positions persons take on validity claims,” and causes, 
such as unconscious brain states.  When reasons are assimilated to causes, as in 
the neuroscientific claim that free will is an illusion, scientific understanding 
itself, which depends on the evaluation of reasons and arguments, is undermined. 
Whether a strict line between reasons and causes, or between the two respective 
language games, can hold, it certainly seems right to suggest that in doing science 
scientists, who themselves are not just brains, engage in the evaluation of reasons 
and arguments about what they should do (how they should act) to maintain the 
validity of their experimental procedures, for example.
16
  It is also clear that their 
actions are or presuppose intersubjective interactions with others.  
Habermas’s own characterization of intersubjectivity, however, reflects an 
emphasis on propositional communication, described in terms of pragmatic 
speech acts. 
 
Thoughts, intentions, and experiences can be attributed only to 
persons, who themselves can develop as persons only in contexts of 
social interaction. It is in the course of their ontogenesis that 
children first learn to take up the pragmatic roles of speaker, hearer, 
and observer and relate to oneself in the corresponding ways…. 
                                                        
16
 I think Searle (2007) misses the point when he argues against Habermas that it is perfectly 
legitimate for scientists to take their own free will as a presupposition which their investigation in 
the end shows to be false.  The issue is not about an inconsistency within the methodological 
boundaries of a particular experiment, but about the ability to do science in the first place.  The 
situation is more like the scientist presupposing that he has a right arm, and by investigation 
demonstrating that to be false, but doing so only by using his right arm. 
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[T]he intersubjective constitution of a mind that is intentionally 
oriented towards the world, communicates via propositional 
contents, and is responsive to rules and standards of validity (2007, 
24-25). 
 
Habermas suggests that there is a logical gap between the other’s mind and her 
behavior.  At the same time he emphasizes the priority of second-person 
interaction over experiential aspects of mind – which have too little propositional 
content and are seemingly inaccessible. 
 
That explains why the intentionalist predicates with which a 
vocabulary must be equipped (if it is to be suitable for describing 
persons and their utterances) can be learned only performatively, 
through being practiced by agents who relate to each other in 
interaction as second persons. (2007, 35). 
 
Trevarthen settled on his terminology of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity after finding the concept of intersubjectivity developed in 
Habermas’s writings on critical theory (personal communication).  In Habermas, 
however, all of the important action, the “action oriented toward reaching 
understanding” is to be found in communicative practices.  Habermas links the 
developmental psychology of Piaget and Kohlberg to his discussion of 
communicative action, but in this respect the earliest experiences of the infant 
have little or nothing to do with such action (see Habermas 1990).  He comes at 
the developmental questions from a perspective already informed by social theory 
and his interest in moral development, and perhaps for this reason he misses the 
importance of the embodied and enactive aspects of non-verbal interaction.
17
   For 
him, coordination of action is the result of reflective processes, but, from the 
perspective of IT, such processes are always informed by pre-reflective 
intersubjective experiences, about which Habermas has little to say. Indeed, in 
these primary and secondary intersubjective experiences the lifeworld, understood 
as a background to communicative action (Habermas 1990, 135), is established.  
Habermas’s starting point is too late in developmental terms to give an account of 
how the lifeworld – the shared world in which we interact – comes to be the 
established background.  Building on work by Selman (1980) and Flavell (1968), 
the interaction he describes is something of a hybrid of ST and TT, framed in 
terms of inferring the intentions of others through the rational adoption of 
different perspectives (1990, 142ff).  
As indicated above, whatever our usual ways of understanding others 
actually are, whether or not these capacities for social cognition are innate or early 
developing, or relatively late developing, they must enter into and constrain, as 
well as enable our communicative practices.  If TT or ST best describe social 
cognition, we would end up with a communicative practice in which the second-
                                                        
17
 We could say of Habermas what Merleau-Ponty says of Piaget: “Piaget … eliminates from adult 
language all that is self-expressive and all that calls to others.” (Merleau-Ponty, CPP, FP 50, word, 
68) 
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person participatory perspective is waylaid since, for TT especially, our relations 
to others are characterized in terms of the 3
rd
-person observational perspective, 
and for ST, interaction is framed in terms of 1
st
-person mechanisms, something, 
as we noted, that raises questions about the nature of diversity.  Neither of these 
standard accounts provides an explanation of what Bruner and Kalmar (1998) 
have called the “massively hermeneutic” background, i.e., the lifeworld, which 
forms a necessary backdrop for communicative processes.  At best, they appeal to 
an already formulated folk psychology as the de jure theory, or as an ad hoc 
primer that lets simulation take the first step into someone else’s shoes. 
More importantly, when one ignores the various capacities for interaction 
found in primary intersubjectivity, communicative practices can only be 
conceived of as a collection of speech acts motivated by a formal a priori trust 
that speakers want to be understood – a formal-pragmatic conception of 
interaction in which one has to argue for the idea that illocutionary force is not 
just something extra added on to expressed propositions (Habermas 1987; 
2000).
18
  In contrast, if one starts with the idea of communicative practices as a 
continuation of the enactive sensory-motor performances of primary 
intersubjectivity, communication is already for action.  That is, we would not 
have to undertake a demonstration of “how communicative acts – that is, speech 
acts or equivalent non-verbal expressions – take on the function of coordinating 
action and make their contribution to building up interactions” (Habermas 1987, 
p. 278). Rather, we would clearly see that speech acts emerge with just this 
function in already established interactions.  The task would be to show how such 
communicative speech acts transform actions that are already non-propositionally, 
non-verbally, communicative. 
In other words, with a detailed account of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity – a set of capacities and practices that characterize not only 
young infants, but continue to characterize relations with others in maturity, albeit 
transformed in communicative and narrative practices – we already have an 
enactive account of interaction, a form of (pre-verbal) communication, and 
already the basis for the opening up of the intersubjective, experiential lifeworld 
in participatory sense-making.  An analysis of communicative practice at the level 
of speech acts doesn’t get off the ground without this more basic framework. 
Moreover, an important part of this detailed account is neuroscientific, at 
least it is if we want the well-rounded story, and if we don’t want to appeal to a 
concept of the lifeworld as a representational (or simulated) illusion.  Getting the 
story right, even at the level of brain processes, seems important with respect to 
just this point of understanding what the lifeworld is – namely, a landscape for 
action and interaction rather than a place for the meeting of minds.
19
  Intentional 
actions are already underway, at a pre-reflective level constrained and enabled by 
sensory-motor processes, as well as by social, cultural, and institutional forces, 
                                                        
18
 Habermas clearly puts the emphasis on speech acts.  “If we were not in a position to refer to the 
model of speech, we could not even begin to analyze what it means for two subjects to come to an 
understanding with one another” (2000, 120). 
19
 For the distinction between the landscape of action and the mentalistic – folk psychological – 
concept of the landscape of consciousness, see Bruner (1986). 
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before we can turn them to account by means of reflective intention formation.  
Deliberative speech acts are already shaped by implicit communicative processes 
of interaction and participatory sense making that have woven together the shared 
lifeworld which makes those more explicit acts possible.  
In this regard, Honneth’s recent work may be more promising, for he does 
include reference to concepts of primary and secondary intersubjectivity.  
Honneth, reviewing the developmental studies of Mead and Piaget, which 
emphasize perspective taking, rightfully criticizes their lack of inclusion of an 
emotional dimension.  He turns to, among others, Peter Hobson and Michael 
Tomasello for clarification on the importance of emotion in developing 
communicative abilities. 
 
The starting point of these investigations consists in the same 
transition from primary to secondary intersubjectivity that the 
cognitivist approaches also have in mind.  These theories suggest that 
at the age of nine months a child makes several notable advances in its 
interactive behavior. It acquires the ability to point out objects to its 
attachment figure by means of protodeclarative gestures and then to 
view these objects with this person. It can further make its attitude 
toward meaningful objects dependent upon the expressive behavior 
with which this other person reacts to these objects. And, finally, the 
child appears, in doing what G. H. Mead calls “playing,” gradually to 
grasp the fact that familiar meanings can be uncoupled from their 
original objects and transferred to other objects, whose new borrowed 
function can then be creatively dealt with. (Honneth 2008, 116). 
 
Although Honneth emphasizes the importance of joint attention and emotional 
attachment as an essential aspect of this development, he leaves aside the full 
complement of what Buckner et al. (2009) have called the “swarm” of interactive 
capacities found in primary intersubjectivity. Interaction theory, integrating the 
rich set of capacities of primary and secondary intersubjectivity (as well as 
narrative competency), presents a fuller picture of what constitutes intersubjective 
interaction than that acknowledged by Habermas or yet by Honneth.  In specific 
regard to the question of communicative behavior, we should not stop short of 
considering the contribution of early interaction capabilities, or the questions that 
concern the neuroscientific understanding of these capabilities. 
If most of the actions that are the concern of critical theory are more 
contextually complex than the typical dyadic relationship that developmental 
psychology addresses, the question still remains, can we not, at least to some 
limited degree, use principles that pertain to dyadic and small group interactions 
to understand the larger and more complex events that involve not only people, 
but institutions, technologies and cultural practices?
20
  One such principle may be 
                                                        
20
 On a related issue Joel Anderson, who translated Habermas’s essay on free will, makes a 
suggestion that has recently been explored, independently, in Gallagher and Crisafi (2009) and 
Crisafi and Gallagher (2009), namely, that these kinds of institutions might be considered from the 
perspective of the extended mind hypothesis.  “The notion of ‘objective mind’ (which stems from 
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that interaction always adds up to more than what each individual brings to the 
encounter.  Interaction itself generates meaning irreducible to any or all of what 
the participants intended (see De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). This relates directly 
to the concept of participatory sense making in which meaning emerges from the 
interaction itself. This is certainly consistent with the view of critical theory, that 
to limit analysis to what individuals intend (or to what is happening in one brain) 
would be to ignore some very real and powerful aspects of interaction that may be 
productive or counterproductive to communicative practices.  
Likewise, the importance that IT places on pragmatic and social contexts 
is clearly relevant to the aims of critical theory. What makes Habermas's concept 
of the ideal speech situation ideal (if not idealistic) is precisely that it tries to strip 
away contextual differences (differences in individual backgrounds, for 
example)
21
 -- differences that actually make a difference in communicative 
practices. IT would side with the hermeneutical claim that real communicative 
situations are always biased by differences.  The only way to deal with such 
differences is through continued interaction, and in ways that recognize the 
differences. Understanding others is not a matter of simulating or matching our 
experience to theirs. Rather, it involves understanding why such simulation, or the 
presumption of simulation, may blind us to diversity, and may lead to distorted 
communicative practices.  
On standard ToM accounts the problem is often posed as follows: “To 
understand interactive minds we have to understand how thoughts, feelings, 
intentions, and beliefs can be transmitted from one mind to the other” (Singer, 
Wolpert and Frith 2004, xvii).  But mental states do not fly through thin air 
between minds; nor are they simply replicated in matching brains. Rather, human 
feelings, intentions, thoughts and beliefs are deeply embedded in backgrounds and 
contexts, in embodied social interactions and communicative practices in the 
everyday lifeworld, and all of these phenomena are characterized by a great many 
differences that need to be recognized and acknowledged.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hegel, where it is often translated as ‘objective spirit’) is used to refer to social institutions, 
customs, shared practices, science, culture, language, and so on-those entirely real parts of the 
human world that are neither held within one individual’s mind nor physically instantiated 
independently from humans. In this sense, then, recent discussions within philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science regarding ‘situated cognition’ or the ‘extended mind’ are also about the 
‘objective mind’” (Translators footnote 5, in Habermas 2007, 42-43). 
21
 For what is sometimes referred to as a hermeneutics of suspicion, Habermas puts a great deal of 
trust in reason: “Whoever enters into discussion with the serious intention of being convinced of 
something through dialogue … has to presume … that the participants allow their ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to 
be determined solely by the force of the better argument” (1996, 367).  Certainly this needs to be 
qualified by the particular differences of the participants – differences that can be communicated 
by narrative means.  See Harrist and Gelfand (2005) for a more detailed analysis of this approach.  
As they point out, “Non-narrative theoretical accounts necessarily emphasize the bias built into the 
theoretical model …. Narrative accounts, on the other hand are flexible enough to allow emphasis 
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